Inflation, Tax Rules, and Capital Formation by Martin Feldstein & Lawrence Summers
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Inflation, Tax Rules, and Capital Formation
Volume Author/Editor: Martin Feldstein




Chapter Title: Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the
Corporate Sector
Chapter Author: Martin Feldstein, Lawrence Summers
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11333
Chapter pages in book: (p. 116 - 152)8 Inflation and the
Taxation of Capital Income
in the Corporate Sector
With Lawrence Summers
This paper presents a detailed examination of the effect of inflation on the
taxation of capital used in the nonfinancial corporate sector of the U.S.
economy. Our analysis shows that, with current tax laws, inflation sub-
stantially increases the effective tax rate on capital income in the corpo-
rate sector. The principal reason for this is that the historic cost method of
depreciation causes a major overstatement of taxable profits, i.e., his-
toric cost depreciation results in a large increase in the level of real
taxable profits at any level of real economic profits. Current methods of
inventory accounting add further to this overstatement of profits for tax
purposes.
According to our most comprehensive calculation, the effect of infla-
tion with existing tax laws was to raise the 1977 tax burden on corporate
sector capital income by more than $32 billion. This extra tax burden
equivalent to 69 percent of the real after-tax capital income of the
nonfinancial corporate sector, including retained earnings, dividends,
and real interest receipts of the corporations' creditors. Since our calcula-
tions show that the total tax burden on this corporate capital income was
$92 billion, the extra tax burden raised the tax by more than 54 percent.
The total effective tax rate on corporate sector capital income in 1977 was
66 percent; without the extra tax caused by inflation, the effective tax rate
would have been only 41 percent.
In contrast to previous studies of the relation between inflation and
corporate tax burdens, we consider not only the tax paid by the corpora-
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tions themselves but also the tax paid by the individuals and institutions
that supply capital to the corporate sector.
1 This is particularly important
for a correct treatment of corporate debt. Inflation implies that the
nominal interest payments that corporations deduct in calculating taxable
profits exceed the real cost of borrowed funds; in itself, this tends to
understate real profits and to lower the effective tax rate.
2 However, the
individuals and institutions that lend to the corporations are taxed on the
overstated nominal interest income.
3 Our calculations show that the
excess tax paid by the lenders is slightly greater than the tax saving of the
corporate borrowers. Since the difference between the relevant tax rate
for borrowers and lenders is quite small, the mismeasurement of interest
income (or, equivalently, the real gains and losses on net corporate debt)
can be ignored without seriously distorting the evaluation of the overall
effect of inflation on the taxation of corporate sector capital.
In addition to our analysis of the nonfinancial corporate sector as a
whole, the present study makes use of an important new source of data
for individual firms on the values of both replacement cost depreciation
and depreciation based on historic costs. Beginning with the year 1976,
the Securities and Exchange Commission has required large corporations
to provide information on replacement cost depreciation and inventory
profits as part of their annual form 10-K reports. We use these data
together with other information on the financial and real performance of
327 individual manufacturing firms in order to examine how inflation has
raised the effective tax rates on different industries.
In the first section of this study, we ignore the mismeasurement of
interest expenses and income in order to focus on the additional taxation
caused by historic cost depreciation and by existing inventory accounting
methods. Section 8.2 then shows that the corporate tax savings that result
from overstating real interest expenses are slightly more than balanced by
the greater tax burdens that the mismeasurement of interest income
imposes on the individuals and institutions that directly and indirectly
supply debt capital to the corporate sector. The total increase in tax
liabilities on corporate source income due to inflation is then estimated in
section 8.3. Section 8.4 describes inflation's impact on effective tax rates.
The fifth section then uses the data on individual firms to calculate the
1. Studies that have focused on inflation's effect on corporate taxes include Davidson
and Weil (1977), Lovell (1978), Shoven and Bulow (1976) and Tideman and Tucker (1977).
The importance of looking through the corporation to examine the return to suppliers of
debt and equity capital is stressed in Feldstein (1976; chap. 3 above), Feldstein, Green, and
Sheshinski (1978; chap. 4 above), and Feldstein and Summers (1978; chap. 9 below).
2. Allowing the deduction of nominal interest payments that exceed real interest pay-
ments is equivalent to ignoring the real gains that accrue to corporations as inflation reduces
the real value of ourstanding corporate debt. In this context, debt should of course be
regarded as gross debt minus nominal assets.
3. The extent of this taxation differs substantially among the different classes of lenders.118 Inflation and Effective Tax Rules
extent of additional taxation in each of the 20 different manufacturing
industries. There is a brief concluding section that discusses the implica-
tions of these higher effective tax rates for capital formation and eco-
nomic performance.
4
8.1 Depreciation Rules, Inventory Accounting
and Corporate Tax Payments
A desirable taxation criterion is that real tax payments should not be
affected by changes in the overall price level which do not alter real
income or wealth. Our tax system violates this standard in its treatment of
corporate profits. When the price level rises and firms' real profits remain
constant, their real tax payments rise both because of historical cost
depreciation and FIFO inventory accounting. The real cost of the depre-
ciating of a firm's capital stock is the replacement cost of the obsolescent
capital. Yet for tax purposes firms are only permitted to deduct deprecia-
tion based on the original purchase price. In inflationary periods, this
may be much less than the replacement cost. Similarly, the cost of
depleting inventories is the replacement cost of the goods, not their
original acquisition cost. Firms which use FIFO inventory cost deduct
only the acquisition cost, giving rise to phantom inventory profits.
In this section, we discuss our estimates of how much existing deprecia-
tion and inventory rules raise corporate taxes in our inflationary econ-
omy. We ignore the role of debt and limit our attention to the tax burdens
at the level of the corporation; this restriction is dropped in the subse-
quent sections where, as we noted in the introduction, we show that
explicit recognition of debt has little effect on the total additional taxation
of all the capital used in the corporate sector because of the offsetting
effects of inflation on the taxation of borrowers and lenders. We begin
this section by examining the experience for 1977, the most recent year
for which all the required information is available. We then discuss the
trends in inflation's effects on the taxation of corporate source income
over the period since 1954.
5
4. The analysis relates only to nonfinancial corporations even when the text refers only
to corporations. Throughout the study we make no attempt to assess the extent to which the
initial tax burdens are shifted to other capital or to labor by changes in the allocation of
capital or in the financial decisions of households and firms. We also ignore state and local
taxes and, to that extent, understate total tax burdens.
5. It is important to recall that firms may use LIFO inventory accounting for tax purposes
only if they also use LIFO in the "book" accounting statements that they report to
shareholders and creditors. Although the extra taxes that result from FIFO accounting are
in a sense voluntary, managements presumably pay these taxes because they believe that
there would be greater costs of some other kind if they used LIFO and reported lower profits
and assets. As long as firms do pay the higher taxes based on FIFO accounts, these taxes do
affect investment and savings decisions.119 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector
8.1.1 The Experience of 1977
Before looking in detail at the data for 1977, we can summarize briefly
the impact of inflation on the taxes paid by nonfinancial corporations in
1977. The cumulative effect of inflation reduced the depreciation allowed
on existing plant and equipment by $39.7 billion in 1977. This raised
corporate tax payments by $19 billion, or nearly one-third of the $59
billion of corporate tax liabilities for 1977. An additional $7 billion in
taxes were paid on artificial inventory profits. Thus, inflation raised
corporate taxes from $33 billion to $59 billion, an increase of 79 percent.
Stating this in a different way, the additional corporate tax caused by
inflation accounts for 57 percent of the $59 billion of corporate tax
liabilities in 1977.
We can now examine the specific data used to calculate these addi-
tional tax burdens. The official national income account estimate of the
1977 real profits of nonfinancial corporations was $113.9 billion.
6 Taxable
profits for those corporations were $143.5 billion in the same year. The
$30 billion difference between these two profit figures is the sum of the
inventory valuation adjustment and the capital consumption adjustment.
The inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) of $14.8 billion implies that
inflation added $14.8 billion of false inventory profits to taxable income.
The capital consumption adjustment (CCA) of $14.7 billion
7 actually
reflects two countervailing differences between real straight-line depre-
ciation and the depreciation allowed for tax purposes: the accelerated
depreciation rules made tax-deductible depreciation exceed straight-line
depreciation by $25.0 billion while inflation reduced the value of tax
deductible depreciation and raised taxable profits by $39.7 billion. We
shall refer to the two components of the CCA as the "acceleration
component" (CCA-A) and the "inflation component" (CCA-I). Thus
historic cost depreciation plus false inventory profits together added
$54.5 billion to taxable profits. With a 48 percent statutory marginal tax
rate, inflation caused a $26 billion increase in corporate tax payments.
In calculating the additional corporate tax payments we have implicitly
assumed that accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit were
enacted to stimulate investment and not as an offset to inflation. It is clear
that these features were enacted long before adjusting taxable income for
6. Survey of Current Business, November 1978. For earlier years, we use the Survey of
Current Business, March 1976, pages 53-57, and updates in the Survey of Current Business.
Depreciation is based on straight-line depreciation at 85 percent of the Bulletin F lives with
depreciation calculated at replacement cost.
7. While the CCA is the only available estimate of the appropriate adjustment of
depreciation allowances, there are serious problems with its construction. It is based on
estimates of "capacity disappearance" rather than as a "value reduction" standard; the two
are only exactly equivalent in the case of exponential depreciation. The underlying data on
asset lives are often old and may as a result be incorrect.120 Inflation and Effective Tax Rules
inflation was a serious issue. Accelerated depreciation was introduced to
the tax law in 1954 (a year in which the CPI actually fell) because of a
conviction that tax depreciation lives were too long. Extensions of
accelerated depreciation in subsequent years appear to have been moti-
vated by a desire to stimulate investment rather than as an offset to
inflation. As Stanley Surrey noted in connection with the 1971 accelera-
tion provisions that created the asset depreciation range (ADR) system.
"The new Asset Depreciation Range system was urged by the Treasury
and adopted by the Congress in 1971 not as a device needed to measure
real net income . . . (but) as an incentive for the purchases of new
machinery and equipment" (Surrey, 1973, p. 32). Similarly the invest-
ment tax credit was introduced as a countercyclical measure to stimulate
demand in 1962, a year in which the CPI rose only 1.2 percent.
Although the tax credits and accelerated depreciation that were legis-
lated before the recent inflation can clearly be regarded as investment
incentives rather than offsets to inflation, it might be argued that the
changes made in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 (and in subsequent
legislation) were intended at least partly as an offset to the inflationary
distortions of the tax liabilities. It is worth emphasizing therefore that
these tax changes have done relatively little to reduce corporate taxes.
The accelerated depreciation component of the capital consumption
adjustment rose from $20.4 billion in 1975 to $25 billion in 1977, an
increase proportional to the nominal level of fixed investment in the
nonfinancial corporate sector. The increase in the amount of the invest-
ment tax credit between 1975 and 1977 due to the liberalization enacted
in 1975
8 cannot be measured precisely but a reasonably accurate "upper-
bound" estimate can be made. If the 3 percent increase in the Investment
Tax Credit rate applied to all equipment investment in 1977, the addi-
tional tax credit for nonfinancial corporations would have been only $3.4
billion. This is clearly an overestimate of the additional investment tax
credit because various limitations prevent all corporations from using the
full 10 percent credit and because the rate is less than 10 percent on
certain types of equipment. Furthermore, the 1975 liberalization of the
I.T.C. can be ascribed at least as plausibly to antirecession policy as to a
desire to offset inflation's impact on taxable profits.
8.1.2 The Period Since 1954
It is useful now to see the growing impact of inflation on tax liabilities
by examining the evolution of taxable income and taxes since 1954.
9 This
8. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 raised the investment tax credit from 7 percent to 10
percent and liberalized the accelerated depreciation rules.
9. We begin with 1954 to avoid the complexities of the excess profits taxes that were
levied during the Korean War. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 represented a major
overhaul of the tax law that, with amendments, continues to provide the framework for
current tax legislation.121 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector
analysis shows that, although inflation has caused some increase in corpo-
rate taxes for the past two decades, the period since 1970 has seen
dramatically greater tax increases induced by inflation.
Table 8.1 presents annual information on the distortion of taxable
profits caused by historic cost depreciation (CCA-I) and by artificial
inventory accounting profits (IVA), the additional tax due to each of
these, and the proportion of actual taxes that are accounted for by these
extra taxes.
Consider first the reduced depreciation for tax purposes caused by
historic cost accounting. Column 2 shows that this reduction in deprecia-
tion (CCA-I) remained less than $10 billion a year until 1970 but reached
$39.7 billion in 1977. The 1977 level is nearly double the 1974 level and
nearly eight times the level of 1967. This is reflected in the corresponding
additional taxes shown in column 5. While the additional tax due to
historic cost depreciation varied between $2 billion and $3 billion a year
until 1967, it has doubled every three years since then: the additional
taxes rose from $2.4 billion in 1967 to $4.8 billion in 1970, $10.3 billion in
1974, and $19.1 billion in 1977. While the extra tax caused by historic cost
depreciation accounted for 9 percent of actual corporate taxes in 1967
(see column 8), it accounted for 32 percent of the taxes paid in 1977.
The artificial inventory profits also remained very small until 1967,
never reaching $3 billion (column 3). More recently, however, inventory
profits have exceeded $10 billion a year and the resulting excess profits
have accounted for more than 10 percent of actual taxes paid.
Column 10 summarizes the overall effect of both sources of increased
taxation. Until 1967, the extra tax caused by inflation accounted for 10
percent to 20 percent of the corporate taxes actually paid. This implies
that the excess tax raised the tax that would otherwise have been paid by
up to 25 percent. During the most recent five years, however, the excess
tax accounted for an average of 50 percent of the corporate taxes actually
paid. This implies that corporate taxes were twice as great as they would
have been if replacement cost depreciation was permitted and artificial
inventory profits were not taxed.
It is important to recognize that these distortions will continue to grow
even if the rate of inflation does not accelerate any further. The under-
statement of an asset's depreciation allowance depends on the increase in
the price level since it was purchased. Hence the understatement of
depreciation will rise until inflation has lasted as long as the oldest asset
which is still being depreciated. The accounting conventions used in our
tax system make taxes very sensitive to the rates of inflation that we have
recently experienced. The substantial additional tax burden caused by
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8.2 The Total Taxation of the Corporate Sector
We now turn to the crucial issue of corporate debt. Although inflation
reduces the real value of outstanding corporate debt, this gain by cor-
porations is not taxable income. Equivalently, corporations subtract
nominal instead of real interest payments in calculating taxable profits. A
number of previous writers on the relation between inflation and corpo-
rate taxes have concluded that the corporate tax saving from the exclu-
sion of real gains on the debt is sufficient to offset the additional tax
caused by the mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory profits.
1
0
This has been interpreted as implying that inflation has no net effect on
the taxation of corporate source income.
These conclusions are misleading because they are based on considera-
tion of only some of the taxes levied on corporate source income. The
basic issue is not the effect of inflation on the corporations' tax liability but
the effect of inflation on the taxation of capital used in the corporate
sector. It is important to look through the corporation to the individuals
and institutions that provide the equity and debt capital. The total tax on
corporate source income includes taxes paid by the owners of corporate
securities on dividends, interest payments, and capital gains. It is this
total tax rather than the tax levied at the corporate level alone that affects
economic incentives.
This perspective is particularly important with respect to interest pay-
ments. While corporations are permitted to deduct nominal rather than
real interest payments, lenders are obliged to pay taxes on nominal
interest receipts. The effect of inflation on the total taxation of interest
income depends on the relative magnitude of the tax rates facing corpo-
rate borrowers on one hand and those who lend to corporations on the
other. If the tax rate of corporate borrowers exceeds that of lenders, total
tax payments fall. Otherwise, tax revenues rise.
1
1
The effect of dividend and capital gains taxes must also be considered.
The mismeasurement of income which gives rise to extra corporate tax
payments reduces dividends and retained earnings. This causes a reduc-
tion in noncorporate taxes which partly offsets the increase in corporate
taxes. Inflation also increases nominal capital gains but not real capital
gains, leading to increases in noncorporate tax payments. A full calcula-
tion of the effects of inflation on the taxation of corporate source income
requires taking account of these effects. The analysis that we present in
this section shows that the relevant weighted average of the marginal tax
rates paid by the individuals and institutions that lend to nonfinancial
10. For example, Shoven and Bulow (1976) and Cagan and Lipsey (1978) reached this
conclusion.
11. The potential balancing between borrowers and lenders is stressed in theoretical
models of the effect of inflation in Feldstein (1976; chap. 3 above), and Feldstein, Green,
and Sheshinski (1978; chap. 4 above).125 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector
corporations is even greater than the marginal rate of tax that is saved by
corporations and their shareholders because of the overstatement of true
interest payments. More specifically, we shall show that the relevant
marginal tax rate for those who lend to corporations is 0.420 while the
relevant combined rate of corporations and their shareholders as borrow-
ers is 0.404.
1
2 Ignoring the real gains and losses on corporate debt there-
fore results in an underestimate of the total excess tax on corporate source
income that is caused by inflation. However, since the difference between
the effective marginal rates of the borrowers and the lenders is quite
small, the whole issue of the real gains and losses on debt (or the
mismeasurement of interest payments) can be ignored without distorting
the measurement of the additional tax caused by inflation.
1
3
Although we believe it is important to examine the effect of inflation on
the total tax burden on corporate source income, we shall also analyze the
effect of inflation on the tax burden of the corporations and their share-
holders. Our calculations, presented in section 8.3 show that the extra
taxes that the corporations and their shareholders pay because of infla-
tion substantially exceed the amount they save by ignoring their inflation-
ary gains on their net debts. Thus whether one looks at total capital
income or only at the equity investors, the data show that inflation raises
the effective tax burden.
8.2.1 Noncorporate Taxation of Equity Income
Owners of corporate equity pay dividend taxes on corporate income if
it is distributed or capital gains taxes if it is retained. The rates at which
these taxes are levied depend on the holder. Individuals, for example,
pay taxes on dividend income at regular income tax rates but pay capital
gains taxes at much lower effective rates. Different financial institutions
pay taxes at varying rates on capital income. As noted below, pension
income is essentially untaxed while certain institutions (e.g. life insurance
companies) actually face higher capital gains tax rates than dividend tax
rates.
The first step in finding the effective tax rate paid on equity income is to
determine the distribution of ownership of corporate equity. Table 8.2
displays the pattern of ownership of corporate equity at the end of 1976 as
reported in the official flow of funds accounts prepared by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The bulk of the equity is held
by households with significant fractions held by pension funds and life
insurance companies. A small portion is held by other financial institu-
12. The reason why the combined effective marginal tax rates for corporations and their
shareholders is less than the 48 percent corporate rate is that the extra corporate tax
payments lead to a reduction in taxes on dividends and retained earnings.
13. Since the lenders and borrowers are not the same individuals, inflation does cause a
redistribution of net income among individuals and institutions.126 Inflation and Effective Tax Rules









































SOURCE: Flow-of-funds data for 1976. Tax rate calculations are described in the text. Note
that tax rates represent conservative assumptions rather than estimates of most likely
values.
a. Includes both private pensions and the retirement funds of state and local government.
b. Comprised primarily of foreign holdings.
tions. The second and third columns of the table indicate the marginal tax
rates on dividends and capital gains for each type of stockowner. We
assume that retained earnings are taxed at the capital gains tax rate.
1
4
We estimate that under 1976 law, the average marginal tax rate on
individual dividend receipts was 39 percent.
1
5
Individual capital gains are taxed at half the statutory rate on divi-
dends. However, gains are taxed only if realized and the effective rate is
reduced by the postponement of realization.
1
5
Bailey (1968) has estimated that each of these factors approximately
halves the effective tax rate on capital gains. Hence we assume a 5 percent
14. Assuming that retained earnings are taxed at the capital gains rate involves the
implicit assumption that each dollar of retained earnings raises share prices by $1.00.
Although Bradford (1979) and Auerbach (1978; appendix to chap. 4 above) have chal-
lenged this assumption by a suggesting that the existing tax rules and dividends make the
equilibrium value of retained earnings less than one, the possibility of distributing the
corporate net worth through mergers and stock repurchases implies that even existing tax
rules do not keep the value of retained earnings below one. While the issue is still in flux, we
adopt the traditional assumption that each dollar of retained earnings raises the share prices
by $1.00. See also Feldstein and Green (1979).
15. The marginal tax rate was found by using the NBER's TAXSIM model to estimate the
additional tax payments arising from a 1% increase in dividend payments. The TAXSIM
model is described in Feldstein and Frisch (1977). We allow for an estimated 7% of equity
held by institutions which are not taxed but which are included by the flow of funds statistics
in the household sector; this estimate of institutional ownership is derived from the SEC
Statistical Bulletin.
16. Individuals who realize capital gains are taxed on the gain which occurred while they
were holding the asset. Hence capital gains which accrue on assets which are passed at death
completely avoid taxation. This is because the new owner is permitted to "step up" his basis
for future tax liabilities.127 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector
tax rate on capital gains. This estimate is conservative because we ignore
the taxes paid under the minimum tax and preference income provisions
of the tax law.
We assume that no taxes are levied on the equity income of pension
funds. In fact, pension recipients do pay taxes on pension income upon
receipt. The effective rate is low, however, because the tax liability is
postponed and because the recipients generally have low marginal tax
rates during retirement. Moreover, increased pension returns may be
associated with reduced employer contributions rather than increased
benefits. In order to be conservative in our estimate of the effective tax




Life insurance companies and commercial banks are taxed at corporate
tax rates on dividends and capital gains. They are permitted to exclude 85
percent of dividends because of the intercorporate dividend exclusion.
Hence, their effective marginal tax rate on dividend income is 7.2
percent.
1
8 These institutions are taxed at a 30 percent statutory rate on
capital gains realizations. We assume an effective rate of 15 percent on
such gains because of the effect of deferral. Unlike our treatment of
individuals, we assume that all gains are eventually realized.
A weighted average of the effective tax rates provides our estimates of
the overall marginal effective rates on dividends and retained earnings. In
order to determine the noncorporate tax rate on all equity income, it is
necessary to determine how corporate profits are divided between div-
idends and retained earnings. We estimate this payout ratio by using the
average payout ratio over the past decade.
1
9 The share of total profits
going to dividends over this period was 46.1 percent, implying an overall
tax rate on equity income of 15.7 percent.
Using this figure it is possible to find the total tax increase on equity due
to a mismeasurement of corporate profits. Suppose that corporate tax-
able income is increased by a single dollar with no change in real income.
The corporation pays 48 cents more in taxes. Shareholder income in the
form of dividends and retained earnings is reduced by 48 cents, leading to
a decline of 7.6 cents in shareholder tax payments. Hence, total tax
payments rise by 40.4 cents. Thus, the marginal tax rate on mismeasured
income is 40.4 percent. Calculations of the increase in corporate taxes
17. It can be argued that the tax treatment of pension income is equivalent to a
consumption tax because income put into pensions escapes all tax until the pension is
withdrawn and presumably consumed. On this view, the effective tax rate on pension
dividend and interest income is zero.
18. This overstates the dividend tax rate for insurance companies because of the special
rules applying to insurance companies.
19. In calculating the payout ratio, profits are adjusted for inflation effects on inventory
and depreciation and on real net indebtedness. We implicitly assume that there are no
"clinetele" effects, so that payout ratio is the same for the equity owned by different classes
of investors.128 Inflation and Effective Tax Rules
due to historical cost depreciation or false inventory accounting overstate
by about 20 percent the true additional burden on the suppliers of equity
capital.
8.2.2 The Value of Corporate Interest Deductions
Corporations are permitted to deduct nominal rather than real interest
payments. Increases in inflation raise the corporations' interest deduc-
tions, thereby reducing corporate tax liabilities. Although the corporate
tax rate is 48 percent, the overstatement of interest expenses reduces
total tax payments by less than 48 percent. This occurs because the
increase in after-tax corporate income results in an increase in noncorpo-
rate tax payments on dividends and capital gains. In section 8.2.1, we
showed that the effective marginal tax rate on dividends and retentions is
15.7 percent; i.e., it was demonstrated that the equity owners' tax rate on
"mismeasured" corporate income was 40.4 percent. This is the correct
measure of the reduction in tax liabilities due to the deduction of nominal
interest. It is this 40.4 percent rate that can be compared with the
marginal tax rate of corporate debt holders in order to determine the
effect of inflation on the taxation of interest income and expenses. In the
next part of this section we consider the extra tax paid by the holders of
corporate debt.
8.2.3 The Tax on Corporate Debt Holders
We now examine the extra taxes that the holders of corporate debt pay
when interest rates rise in response to a higher rate of inflation.
Equivalently, we estimate the amount by which their taxes would be
reduced if the taxation of interest income were indexed. We also examine
the extra taxes corporations pay on their interest-bearing financial assets.
In table 8.3 we display the nonfinancial corporate sectors' interest-
bearing financial assets and liabilities at the end of 1976. The holders of
these securities are shown in the different columns. These figures are
derived directly from the official flow of funds accounts. The penultimate
row provides the net corporate debt holdings of each class of investor,
formed by aggregating the entries in the column. In order to calculate the
effective tax rate on the holders of corporate debt, we find the weighted
average of marginal tax rates for each investor class.
Before describing our estimates of the specific marginal tax rates,
several features of table 8.3 deserve comment. First, most corporate debt
is not in the form of bonds. Nearly half is comprised of bank borrowing
and mortgages. Second, only a small proportion of corporate interest
payments, less than 15 percent, goes to individuals. The largest portion
goes to commercial banks. Third, it is important to recall that corpora-
tions themselves hold a large quantity of interest-bearing financial assets.129 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector




Our estimate of the marginal tax rate facing each class of creditors is
shown in the bottom row of table 8.3. These estimates are only approxi-
mate since the laws governing financial institutions are quite complex and
since all of the desired information is not available. Fortunately, the
estimates that are most uncertain generally apply to only small quantities
of debt. When in doubt, we have selected relatively conservative assump-
tions. The rationale for each of our estimates now follows:
Households. According to the NBER TAXSINT model, the weighted
average of the marginal tax rates on interest income is about 25 percent.
However, this average includes bank deposit interest as well as interest
on corporate securities. Since corporate bonds are held by more affluent
taxpayers than ordinary bank account time deposits (see Projector and
Weiss, 1966), the 25 percent overall figure for all interest payments is too
low. We have selected a 35 percent tax rate on interest paid, thereby
implying that household bondholders have lower marginal tax rates on
average than household dividend recipients.
Pensions. These are conservatively treated as fully tax exempt, im-
plying a zero marginal tax rate.
Commercial Banks. Commercial banks pay a 48 percent corporate
income tax at the margin on interest receipts. Those interest receipts net
of corporate tax are then subject to further taxes as dividends and
retained earnings; we assume the same 15.7 percent rate for this equity
income that we derived in section 8.2.1 for the equity income of nonfinan-
cial corporations. Combining the 48 percent and the 15.7 percent implies
an overall tax on this equity income of 56.1. However, when the interest
rates that banks charge rise, banks also raise the interest payments that
they make to their depositors. To the extent that these interest payments
rise, the banks do not pay extra taxes but their depositors do. Of course,
there is no increase in the interest paid on demand deposits. We assume
that interest rate ceilings constrain the increase in other interest rates to
0.3 percent for each 1 percent increase in inflation.
2
1 When this is allowed




Mutual Savings Banks. In some cases, these banks pay the same 48
percent tax as ordinary corporations. However, mutual savings banks
with a sufficient fraction of their assets in the form of local mortgages are
20. In some cases this leads to deductions for the issuers of the assets.
21. This assumption is based on a regression for the 1954-77 period of the time deposit
rate on the rate of inflation.
22. This assumes that demand deposits account for 38 percent of total bank liabilities
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allowed to exclude a fraction of their portfolio income, a fraction that
increases with the mortgage share. The overall effective rate must also
reflect the extent to which mutual savings banks raise the interest rate
they pay and the corresponding marginal tax rate of their depositors. We
estimate a 24 percent overall rate for these institutions based on the
assumption that about half of marginal income is successfully sheltered.
Life Insurance Companies. Life insurance companies are taxed accord-
ing to the "Menge Formula" or "ten-to-one rule" which allows insurance
companies to exclude a portion of their portfolio income before applying
the 48 percent corporate tax rate (see Huebner, 1976, for a discussion of
this tax rule). The procedure in the existing law is designed to separate
investment income into an amount required to meet the funding require-
ments for existing insurance and a residual profit that is deemed taxable.
To achieve this, life insurance companies pay tax on a percentage of
income equal to ten times the difference between the average nominal
yield on the portfolio (i) and the nominal yield that the insurance commis-
sioners deem to be the appropriately conservative yield to use in calculat-
ing required reserves (s). Thus if the assets of the insurance company (/I)
are invested at a nominal yield of i, the total tax liability of the company is
T = 0.48[10(/ - s)]iA. The change in the effective tax rate caused by
inflation depends on how i and s adjust. As we noted above, the nominal
market yield (i) generally rises point for point for expected inflation. In
contrast, the regulatory authorities have not altered s in response to
inflation; historically, s has remained close to 3 percent for the past 70
years. The marginal tax rate implied by this tax formula for increases in
the interest rate is an increasing function of the initial marginal tax rate.
Evaluating the marginal tax rate at the relatively conservative value of i
= 0.07 implies a marginal tax rate of 0.57.
2
3 We use this value to be
conservative; at higher initial interest yields, the effective marginal tax
would be even greater. Note we are also conservative in ignoring the tax
paid on dividends and retained earnings of the nonmutual life insurance
companies.
Finance Companies and Other Insurance. These are taxed like ordinary
corporations. Combining the 48 percent corporate rate with the addi-
tional tax on dividends and retained earnings yields an overall marginal
tax rate of 57.1 percent on this type of income.
Government. We assume that government neither pays taxes on in-
terest receipts nor deducts expenses for tax purposes. While increases in
23. Note that at i = .07, a $1,000 portfolio earns $70. With s = .03 only 40 percent of this
or $28 is taxed; the tax is $13.44 and the net income is therefore $56.56. Raising the interest
rate to i = .08 implies earnings of $80 but 50 percent or $40 is taxable. The tax is thus $19.20,
leaving a net income of $60.80. Note that an extra $10 of gross interest raises net interest
income by only $4.24. The effective marginal tax rate is thus 57.6 percent.133 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector
interest receipts may enable governments to reduce other taxes, there is
no reason to suppose that capital taxes will be reduced. Moreover, other
costs of government are increased by raising interest rates.
Miscellaneous. The interest on these assets is assumed to be untaxed.
Note that "miscellaneous" includes assets and liabilities of the rest of the
world so our no-tax assumption implies that no taxes are paid to either the
U.S. or to foreign governments by foreigners owning bonds of U.S.
corporations. It is clear that our assumption that all of this income is
untaxed is very conservative.
In order to calculate the marginal tax rate on interest income, we have
averaged the marginal tax rates shown in the final row of Table 8.3,
weighting by the share of debt owned the class of investors' share of debt.
The results imply a marginal rate of 0.420 on interest income.
This implies that inflation raises the taxation of interest income, since
the tax rate that lenders pay exceeds that at which corporations deduct.
Allowing in the overall calculation for the impact of inflation on debt thus
actually strengthens the conclusion that inflation raises the effective
taxation of capital income. This effect is, however, quite small. It is equal
to 1.6 percent of net interest payments (the difference between the 42
percent of lenders and the 40.4 percent of corporate borrowers or about a
half billion dollars per year). This is dwarfed by the depreciation and
inventory effects described in the previous section.
While several of our estimated marginal tax rates are only approxi-
mate, they pertain to relatively small amounts of debt. It is unlikely that a
more exact estimate of these numbers would alter our basic conclusion
that the tax on those who lend to corporations is at least as great as the
rate at which corporations and their owners can deduct interest pay-
ments.
8.3 The Increased Taxation of Corporate Source Income
The first section of this paper presented calculations of the additional
tax paid by corporations because of the mismeasurement of depreciation
and inventories. The current section extends that calculation in three
significant ways to obtain the total increased tax on corporations, on
equity owners, and on all sources of capital for nonfinancial corporations.
Our calculations show that inflation raised the total tax on the income
of nonfinancial corporations by $32.3 billion. This amount is substantially
greater than the $26.1 billion additional tax paid by corporations them-
selves because of the mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory
profits.
We begin by analyzing the several effects of inflation in 1977. Estimates
for the years since 1954 are then presented.134 Inflation and Effective Tax Rules
8.3.1 An Analysis for 1977
We proceed in three steps to calculate the total additional taxes on
corporate source income in 1977. We first calculate the excess tax paid by
the corporation itself, recognizing the effect of not taxing the real gains
on debt as well as the effect on depreciation and inventory profits. We
then extend this to obtain the total excess tax paid by equity owners,
including the effect on the tax liabilities of the corporations and the
shareholders. Finally, we extend the calculation to the total excess tax
including the tax paid by those who lend to the nonfinancial corporations.
The calculations in section 8.1 showed that historic cost depreciation
and the existing inventory accounting practices added $26.1 billion to the
1977 tax liabilities of nonfinancial corporations. In 1977 these corpora-
tions had net interest bearing liabilities
2
4 of $592.2 billion and non-
interest-bearing assets (primarily cash and net accounts receivable
25) of
$130.9 billion. Their net nominal liabilities were thus $461.3 billion. Since
the 1977 inflation rate was 6.8 percent (the December-to-December
increase in the CPI), these corporations had a real gain of $31.4 billion on
their net liabilities. Excluding the gain from the corporations' taxable
income saved them $15.1 billion in corporate tax. These tax savings thus
offset approximately one-half of the $26.0 billion of extra tax caused by
the existing tax treatment of inventories and debt. Inflation caused cor-
porations to pay an extra tax of $11 billion in 1977.
The extra tax paid by the equity owners of the corporations differs in
two ways from the extra tax paid by the corporations. First, as we
discussed earlier, the extra tax paid at the corporate level leaves less
income to be taxed as dividends. With a dividend payout rate of 0.46 and
effective marginal tax rates of .287 on dividends and 0.047 on retained
earnings, the $11 billion of extra corporate tax reduces shareholders own
taxes by $1.7 billion. Second, the shareholders must eventually pay
capital gains tax on the nominal increase in the market value of the
company that results from inflation. Since this nominal increase in value
is over and above the real increase due to retained earnings the extra tax
paid on this nominal gain represents an extra tax caused by inflation. We
shall assume that the nominal gain can be approximated by the product of
the inflation rate and the real value of corporate assets.
2
6 The relevant
marginal rate of tax on these accrued nominal gains is the effective capital
gains tax rate of 0.047. The real value of the physical assets of these
24. See section 8.2 for a description of the composition of this net amount. Note that
$592.2 billion is net of the interest-bearing assets of these firms.
25. These assets also include Treasury bills and other federal government securities that
bear interest since the important distinguishing feature of these "non-interest-bearing
assets" is that private individuals and institutions do not pay any interest on them.
26. The actual nominal gain caused by inflation is very hard to disengage from other
changes in market value. Theoretical considerations imply that a change in the expected
rate of inflation will cause an inverse change in the market valuation ratio which then slowly
returns to its equilibrium value (see Feldstein, 19806; chap. 10 below).135 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector
corporations (plant and equipment, inventories and land)
2
7 in 1977 was
$1,684 billion. The inflation rate of 6.8 percent and the tax rate of 0.047
imply an additional capital gains tax of $5.3 billion. The total excess tax
on the equity owners of the nonfinancial corporations is therefore the
sum of three terms: the $11 billion of extra corporate income tax minus
the $1.7 billion resulting reduction in personal taxes plus the capital gains
tax of $5.3 billion. Inflation thus induced a net extra tax of $14.6 billion on
corporations and their owners in 1977.
To obtain the total additional taxation on corporate source income that
is caused by inflation, the additional taxation of corporate creditors must
be added to this $14.6 billion. The net financial capital supplied by the
creditors of these corporations was $595.2 billion.
2
8 The inflation rate of
6.8 percent imposed a real loss of $40.5 billion that should have been
offset against the interest income of the creditors. The effective marginal




Combining this $17 billion with the $14.6 billion implies an extra tax on
corporations and their owners of $31.6 billion. This additional tax on
corporate source income was 54 percent of the corporate income tax
liabilities of $59 billion and 34 percent of the combined corporate, share-
holder, and lender tax liabilities of $93 billion. Stated in yet a different
way, the excess tax of $31.6 billion caused by inflation is equivalent to an
additional wealth tax or capital levy of 2 percent on the real corporate
assets of $1,684 billion. Since these corporations earn between 10 and 12
percent on their real assets,
3
0 this extra tax absorbs between one-sixth and
one-fifth of pretax real earnings.
8.3.2 The Period Since 1954
This same framework can be used to calculate the additional tax caused
by inflation in each year since 1954.
3
1 Since we do not have a detailed
flow-of-funds calculation of the sort presented in section 8.2 for each
year, we shall use the same effective marginal tax rates for all years. The
calculations therefore represent the additional tax that would have been
caused for each year if the 1976 statutory tax rates and composition of
creditors and debtors had prevailed; differences that result from using
actual statutory rates and ownership information would be small relative
to the differences over time caused by the changing history of inflation.
Table 8.4 traces the evolution of the inflation-generated additional
27. The data came from Von Furstenberg (1977).
28. We ignore the corporate assets in the form of government securities and net accounts
receivable because these do not represent the supply of financial capital by private investors.
29. We neglect here the capital gains or losses accruing to firms and bondholders in
existing debt when the interest rate changes.
30. See Feldstein and Summers (1977).
31. These are additional taxes due to inflation in the sense that they would not have been
paid if the system were fully indexed.CO CO <L) 9 E
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taxation of corporate source income between 1954 and 1977. Column 2
repeats the figures from table 8.1, column 7, of the excess tax at the
corporate level due to the mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory
profits. The corporate tax savings due to ignoring the real gains on net
corporate debt are presented in column 3. It is worth noting that the
additional tax paid to the mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory
profits always exceeds the tax savings on the debt gains. The net excess at
the corporate level, presented in column 4, remains relatively low (less
than $5 billion) until 1974 when it jumped to $8.7 billion.
The reduced taxation of dividends and retained earnings due to higher
corporate tax payments is shown in column 5 and the capital gains tax
liability on the nominal capital gains caused by inflation is shown in
column 6. Combining columns 4, 5, and 6 gives the net increase in the
taxation of equity capital presented in column 7. This additional tax on
equity income remained less than $5 billion until 1970 but has exceeded
$10 billion annually since 1974. The additional tax on equity income since
1970 has totalled more than $80 billion.
Column 8 presents the very important additional tax on the individuals
and institutions that provide debt capital to the nonfinancial corpora-
tions. This excess tax on lenders reached $5 billion in 1968 and exceeded
$15 billion in 1973. The additional tax on those who lent to nonfinancial
corporations has exceeded $100 billion in the brief period from 1970 to
1977.
The total additional tax on corporate source income caused by inflation
is shown in column 9. Three things should be noted about these figures.
First, this total extra tax caused by inflation exceeds the extra tax paid by
corporations because of the mismeasurement of depreciation and inven-
tory profits (column 2). Focusing exclusively on the extra corporate taxes
paid because of the mismeasurement of depreciation and inventory
profits is therefore a conservative evaluation of the total inflationary
impact. Second, the total excess tax remained less than $5 billion a year
until 1966, doubled by 1970 and doubled again by 1973. The excess tax
has exceeded $20 billion a year since 1973. Third, the total excess tax on
corporate source income has exceeded $180 billion in the period between
1970 and 1977.
Finally, column 10 states the total excess tax on corporate source
income as a percentage of the corporate tax liability. Although the extra
tax remained less than one-sixth of corporate income tax payments until
the mid-1960s, it then quickly rose to more than one-third of the corpo-
rate income tax. For the final five years, the excess tax payments have
been more than 50 percent of corporate tax liabilities.139 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector
8.4 The Effective Tax Rate on Corporate Source Income
This section presents our estimates of the total effective tax rate on the
real capital income earned in the corporate sector. Our calculations show
that the total tax on corporate source income in 1977, including the tax
liabilities of shareholders and lenders as well as of the corporations
themselves, was $91.8 billion, an effective tax rate of 67 percent on the
real pretax income of the nonfinancial corporate sector. The data show
that this 67 percent represents a substantial increase in the effective tax
rate over the past decade and a return to the effective tax rates of the
mid-1950s.
The substantial increase in the effective tax rate despite statutory
reductions reflects the impact of inflation. The $32.3 billion of extra tax
caused by inflation in 1977 accounts for more than one-third of the total
tax on corporate source income, raising the effective total tax rate from
43 percent to 66 percent. The extra tax caused by inflation has thus offset
all of the accelerated depreciation and other legislated tax reductions
during the past two decades.
8.4.1 The Effective Tax Rate in 1977
The best measure of the tax burden on corporate source income is the
ratio of the total tax paid on such income—including the taxes paid by
shareholders and lenders as well as by the corporations—to the total real
income available before tax for the shareholders and creditors. The
official national income estimate of 1977 profits with the inventory valua-
tion adjustment and capital consumption adjustment was $113.9 billion.
Net nominal interest payments by nonfinancial corporations were $33.7
billion. It seems at first that the total pretax income available for share-
holder and creditors could be obtained by simply adding these adjusted
profits and net interest on the grounds that it is unnecessary to adjust
interest payments for inflation since any correction to nominal interest
expenses by the corporation would required an equal correction to
nominal receipts by creditors. Although this is a generally correct princi-
ple, one further modification is required. A significant fraction of the
corporations' financial assets are not liabilities of investors but of the
government or of the corporations' customers. When inflation lowers the
real value of these assets, the loss to the corporations is a gain to the
government and to the corporations' customers and not to individual or
institutional investors. The corporations' loss on these financial assets
should therefore be subtracted from other corporate profits. In 1977,
these assets were $130.9 billion, the inflationary loss was therefore $8.9
billion. The 1977 total pretax corporate sector income available for
shareholders and creditors was therefore $138.7 billion.140 Inflation and Effective Tax Rules
Our estimated total tax of $91.8 billion on this income consists of five
components. (1) The largest of these is the corporate income tax pay-
ments of $59 billion. This alone represents an effective tax rate of 42.5
percent on total corporate source income. (2) Dividends in 1977 were
$39.1 billion; an effective tax rate of 0.287 on dividends implies a tax
liability of $11.2 billion
3
2 and adds 8.1 percent to the effective tax rate. (3)
The national income account estimate of $16 billion of retained earnings
3
3
ignores the real gain on outstanding debt. With a net debt of $461.3
billion and a 6.8 percent inflation rate, the additional real retained
earnings were $31.4 billion. The total retained earnings of $47.4 billion
are eventually subject to capital gains taxation with an effective tax rate
of 0.047; this adds $2.2 billion to the total tax and 1.6 percent to the
effective tax rate. (4) An additional capital gains tax liability results from
the nominal increase in the value of corporate assets that accompanies a
general rise in the price level. We abstract from the particular market
fluctuations of 1977 and calculate that the real capital stock with an initial
value of $1,684 billion rose by 6.8 percent. With a tax rate of 4.7 percent,
this nominal increase implies an effective tax of $5.4 billion, adding 3.9
percent to the total effective tax rate. (5) Finally, the nominal interest
payments of $33.7 billion were taxable income of the creditors. With a tax
rate of 0.42, these interest payments involve a tax liability of $14.2 billion,
adding 10.2 percent to the effective tax rate.
3
4 The total of these five
figures of tax payments is thus $92 billion for a total effective tax rate of
66.3 percent.
Before turning to a comparison of 1977 with earlier years, it is useful to
contrast the actual effective tax rate of 66.3 percent with several alterna-
tive rates that are frequently cited. Perhaps the most common measure of
the corporate tax burden is the ratio of the $59 billion corporate income
tax to the conventionally measured corporate profits of $143.5 billion; the
resulting rate of 41.1 percent is a gross underestimate of the actual total
rate. An alternative and more sophisticated rate is the ratio of the
corporate income tax to the sum of corporate profits with the inventory
valuation and capital consumption adjustments ($113.9 billion) plus the
real gains on the net corporate debt ($31.4 billion); the resulting rate of
40.6 percent is again less than two-thirds of the total burden. These
calculations underline the importance of looking beyond the corporation
32. This calculation uses our estimated marginal tax rate on dividends to measure the
average tax rate on dividends. This causes an overstatement of the tax liability, but the error
is likely to be very small.
33. This is the official figure for the undistributed profits corrected for the inventory
valuation and capital consumption adjustments.
34. We are again using an estimated marginal tax rate as an average tax rate on this
income. This causes some overstatement, particularly for life insurance companies. Adjust-
ing this to use an average rather than marginal tax rate for life insurance companies might
reduce the tax by up to $2 billion dollars.141 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector
to the shareholders and creditors in order to obtain a correct picture of
total tax burdens on capital used in the corporate sector.
8.4.2 Variations in the Effective Total Tax Rate Since 1954
Table 8.5 traces the variations in the effective total tax rate on corpo-
rate capital since 1954. The total real income presented in column 1 is the
sum of real profits as measured by the national income statistics and net
nominal interest payments with an adjustment for corporate losses on
government assets and net accounts receivable.
Actual corporate tax liabilities as a percentage of this total real income
have declined nearly one-fifth since the mid-1950s. Moreover, there has































































































































































































































66.3142 Inflation and Effective Tax Rules
been no increase at all in this ratio between 1970 and 1977. This has
incorrectly led some observers to discount the argument that inflation
raised real tax burdens on capital income.
The varying taxes on shareholders and creditors in columns 3 through 6
reflect variations in dividends, full retained earnings, inflationary appre-
ciation, and interest payments. The same 1977 effective tax rates are
assumed for each tax base; allowing for statutory changes would raise
taxes on dividends and interest income in the earlier years and in those
years but this effect would be relatively small.
The net result of these changes is shown in the total effective tax rate
presented in column 7. Despite the decline in the relative corporate tax
payments, the overall effective tax rate is as high now as it was in the
mid-1950s. The effect of inflation has been powerful enough to offset the
introduction of the investment tax credit, the cuts in the corporate tax
rate, and the more rapid acceleration of depreciation.
3
5
8.5 Inflation and Corporate Tax Liabilities in
Two-Digit Manufacturing Industries
Although historic cost depreciation and existing accounting practices
raise the tax liabilities of all corporations, their importance varies sub-
stantially among different industries. The current section presents in-
formation for each of the 20 two-digit manufacturing industries. For
manufacturing as a whole, the additional taxes in 1976 caused by historic
cost depreciation and existing accounting practices accounted for slightly
more than half of all the federal tax liabilities of these firms. These
additional taxes varied from less than 25 percent of actual taxes in a few
industries to 100 percent of the taxes paid in several others. If the taxes
are expressed as a percentage of the real value of capital used in these
industries, the additional tax varies from less than 1 percent of capital to
nearly 3 percent of capital. The very high tax rates that result in several of
the industries make it particularly difficult for them to compete for
capital. If these additional tax burdens persist, the allocation of capital
among manufacturing industries will be substantially distorted by infla-
tion.
Our analysis of the additional tax burdens of individual industries is
based on information supplied by individual firms in their annual reports
and 10-K forms. Beginning with 1976, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has required the largest firms to supply information on
replacement cost depreciation and on inflation-adjusted inventory gains
as well as on historic cost depreciation and on their inventory profits as
35. We have ignored state and local taxation of corporate source income through
corporate income rates, property taxes, and individual income rates. If these taxes were
included, an increase in the effective tax rate would be observed and the current rate would
exceed 66 percent.143 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector
they are used for tax purposes. We use the differences between the
inflation-adjusted and the unadjusted figures for depreciation and inven-
tories to measure the overstatement of taxable profits. For each industry,
we then compare the total additional tax liabilities implied by these
overstated profits with the actual tax liabilities paid by the firms in our
sample. We also calculate the additional tax payments as a percentage of
the real value of the capital used by the sample firms in the industry.
3
6
Finally, we use the ratio of sales by the sample firms to sales by all firms in
the industry to estimate the total additional taxes caused in each industry




Although the general approach of these calculations parallels the
analysis of section 8.1, there are several differences that should be borne
in mind in interpreting the results. First, the information supplied by the
firms represents consolidated accounts and not just the domestic activi-
ties that were analyzed in section 8.1. Because we are forced to include
the overseas depreciation and inventory gains, we overstate the extent of
overtaxation. Second, the firms provide the historic cost depreciation and
replacement cost depreciation as alternative measures of "book" depre-
ciation rather than "tax" depreciation. Since the straight-line "book"
depreciation is less than the accelerated "tax" depreciation, this proce-
dure causes us to understate the extent of overtaxation. The net effect of
these two countervailing biases cannot be determined from the existing




The sample of firms for which we have information represents approx-
imately 50 percent of the total sales of manufacturing firms. Because of
the nature of the SEC requirement, the sample consists exclusively of
large firms. Moreover, the coverage varies substantially among the indus-
tries with a very much smaller fraction of sales in the samples for some
industries than for others. The tables in this section indicate the number




36. Estimates of the replacement cost value of plant, equipment, and inventories are
also required by the SEC.
37. We do not analyze the effects of inflation on real indebtedness because data on the
ownership of securities by industry does not exist. The results in section 8.2 suggest that this
omission is not likely to have a great impact on the conclusions.
38. These results should be viewed with caution for other reasons. There appear to be
wide variations in the methods used by firms in estimating replacement cost figures. There is
no necessary correspondence between the depreciation lives used by firms and those used in
the construction of the aggregate statistics presented above.
39. To estimate total sales in each industry, we use the Compustat file of 2,500 firms
prepared by Standard and Poor. The 1,332 manufacturing firms in this file represent 1976
sales of $1,052 billion or 87 percent of all manufacturing sales as estimated by the Federal
Trade Commission. We use the Compustat file to estimate total sales by industry in order to
be sure that firms are classified by industry in the same way as in our replacement cost
sample.144 Inflation and Effective Tax Rules
Table 8.6 presents information on the extent of reduced depreciation
and the consequent additional taxation. The first two columns show the
number of firms in the sample and the percentage of the total industry
sales accounted for by the sample firms. The third column shows the
understatement of depreciation, i.e., the difference between replace-
ment cost depreciation and historic cost depreciation. The additional tax
liability presented in column 4 is calculated by summing (for all the
sample firms in the industry) 0.48 times each firm's understated deprecia-
tion up to the limit of the tax actually paid by the firm. Note that this is a
very conservative statement of the additional tax for any firm in which the
limit constrains our calculated amount because it assumes that no addi-
tional profits would have been earned even at a zero tax rate and disre-
gards the possibility of carrying losses forward. Column 5 expresses the
additional tax as a percentage of the total federal tax liability of the firms
in the sample while column 6 states the additional tax liability as a
percentage of the replacement cost value of the firms' real capital stock.
4
0
The remaining two columns are estimates for all the firms in the industry
and not just the sample; they are obtained by rescaling the sample values
for each industry by the ratio of total industry sales to sales in the sample.
The relative importance of the additional taxes that resulted from the
understatement of depreciation varied substantially among the 20 indi-
vidual industries. Column 5 shows that these additional taxes represented
less than one-sixth of actual 1976 tax liabilities in 6 of the 20 industries.
These are primarily nondurable goods (tobacco, apparel, printing and
publishing, and leather and footwear) but also include the nonelectrical
machinery and instruments industries. At the other extreme, there are
four industries in which the additional tax represents more than three-
fourths of actual tax liabilities: primary metals, rubber, paper, and wood
products.
A similar picture of very substantial variation emerges when the addi-
tional taxation is related to the replacement cost value of the firms' real
capital stock (column 6). The additional tax varies from 0.4 percent of the
real capital stock in the primary metals industry
4
1 and 0.5 percent in the
nonelectrical machinery industry to 2.0 percent in the paper industry and
2.8 percent in the wood products industry.
For manufacturing as a whole, the reduction in real depreciation
totalled $18 billion or half of the reduction for all nonfinancial corpora-
40. The real capital stock includes inventories as well as property, plant, and equipment
but excludes financial assets and liabilities.
41. This tax is kept so low because the extra tax is assumed to be no greater than actual
taxes paid which, in the case of primary metals, were kept low by extremely low real profits.145 Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector
tions that was discussed in section 8.1. Nondurable goods industries (SIC
codes 20 through 29) accounted for 58 percent of this reduced deprecia-
tion or $10.4 billion. Reduced depreciation in durable goods industries
(SIC codes 30 through 39) was $7.6 billion. The additional tax caused by
the understatement of depreciation was $7.6 billion, of which $4.9 billion
was in nondurable goods industries and $2.7 billion was in durable goods
industries.
Table 8.7 presents the combined effects of reduced depreciation and
overstated inventory profits. The organization of the table parallels that
of table 8.6. The results presented in column 5 show very substantial
variation among industries in the importance of the extra tax as a percent-
age of actual taxes paid. In two of the industries (leather and nonelectri-
cal machinery), the extra tax amounted to less than 20 percent of the
actual tax paid. In contrast, four of the industries (wood and wood
products; paper; rubber; and steel) would have paid no tax if deprecia-
tion had been calculated at replacement cost and if the artificial inventory
profits were also eliminated. Column 6 confirms the picture of substantial
variation among industries by comparing the additional tax to the re-
placement value of the real capital stock. The extra tax paid (as limited by
the total tax paid) varied from less than 1 percent of the capital stock on
the primary metals and nonelectrical machinery industries to nearly 3
percent of the capital stock in the food industry and in textiles.
For all manufacturing industries, the mismeasurement of depreciation
and inventories totaled $27.1 billion or 54 percent of the aggregate
reported for all nonfinancial corporations in section 8.1. Of this $27.1
billion total, 58 percent was accounted for by nondurable manufacturing.
Note that this 58 percent is the same as the figure for depreciation only,
implying that the mismeasurements of inventories and depreciation are
distributed in the same way. The additional taxation for manufacturing
firms totalled $11.3 billion, of which $7.4 billion was in the nondurable
goods industries.
8.6 Conclusion
The tax laws of the United States were designed at a time when there
was little or no inflation. The analysis in this paper has shown that, with
the existing tax laws, inflation substantially increases the effective tax rate
on capital income in the nonfinancial corporate sector. In contrast to
earlier studies of the impact of inflation on corporate tax burdens, we
have considered not only the tax paid by the corporations themselves but
also the taxes paid by the individuals and institutions that supply capital
to the corporate sector. This is particularly important for a correct
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tax paid by lenders because of inflation is actually slightly greater than the
taxes that corporate borrowers save by deducting higher nominal interest
payments.
The overall effect of inflation with existing tax laws was to raise the real
1977 tax burden on corporate sector capital income by more than $32
billion. This extra tax represented 69 percent of the real after-tax capital
income of the nonfinancial corporate sector, including retained earnings,
dividends, and the real interest receipts of the corporations' creditors.
The extra tax raised the total tax burden on nonfinancial corporate capital
income by more than one-half of its noninflation value, raising the total
effective tax rate from 43 percent to 66 percent.
The substantial increase in the effective tax rate on capital used in the
nonfinancial corporate sector can influence the performance of the econ-
omy in a number of important ways. The most obvious of these is a
reduction in the rate of capital formation in response to the reduction in
the real after tax return.
4
2
Moreover, since the tax rules that we have emphasized do not apply to
residential real estate, the combination of inflation and existing tax rules
will encourage a redistribution of investment away from the corporate
sector and to residential construction and consumer durables. Within
total corporate investment, existing tax rules will induce firms to invest
more in inventories and less in equipment and structures.
The evidence on individual manufacturing industries presented in sec-
tion 8.5 shows that there is substantial variation among industries in the
extent to which inflation has caused greater tax burdens. In some indus-
tries, the additional tax induced by inflation accounts for less than 25
percent of actual taxes paid; in other industries, the additional tax in-
duced by inflation is responsible for the entire actual tax payment. The
additional tax varies from less than 0.5 percent of the real capital in two
industries to nearly 3 percent in others. This substantial variation implies
a further source of capital misallocations among individual industries
within the overall manufacturing sector.
42. Although this reduction cannot be unambiguously established, in any realistic life
cycle model a lower net return will reduce private saving (Summers, 1978). Some prelimi-
nary empirical evidence tends to support this view (Boskin, 1978).Ill Interest Rates
and Asset Yields